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Weinburger v. UOP: 
Analysis of a Dissent 
JAN G. DEUTSCH* 
This article examines the dissent of Justice Duffy in the now 
withdrawn Delaware Supreme Court opinion of Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc. which affirmed the lower-court decision and ruled that 
a cash-out merger whereby a parent company bought out the 
minority shareholders of a subsidiary was permissible.':":' The 
court concluded that the price was fair, there was a proper pur-
pose for the transaction, and that the investment banking firm 
that was paid by the parent company had no fiduciary duty to the 
minority and, absent a showing of a conspiracy, was not liable 
for damages. 
The Legality of Cash-Out Mergers 
What the law is, has become an increasingly difficult question to 
answer as the Delaware Supreme Court continues to render decisions 
governing the legality of cash-out mergers. The latest attempt to lay 
down a rule in this area, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc./ involved the follow-
ing facts: 
Following a merger between UOP, Inc., a corporation in which The 
Signal Companies, Inc. had held a majority interest and Sigco In-
corporated, a wholly owned subsidiary of Signal, the plaintiff, a 
former minority shareholder of UOP who was cashed out, brought 
suit. . . . After lengthy . . . proceedings, the Vice Chancellor, in an 
exhaustive decision entered judgment for the defendants. 2 
,, Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
''"''Reargument in this matter has been granted and held. Justice Duffy, whose 
opinion is analyzed in this article, has retired. That opinion (as well as the foot-
note in note 22 infra) has been withdrawn by the court. 
1 Slip op. (Feb. 9, 1982). 
2 /d. at 2. 
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The Weinberger Majority Opinion 
The decision rendered by McNeilly and Quillen, for the majority, 
seems clear and to the point. "Basically," they note, "as to the conten-
ti<?nS raised on appeal, we find no reason to justify reversing the final 
conclusions of the Vice Chancellor." :: Although the majority did "find 
it desirable to focus our attention briefly on two of the multiple issues 
raised, the status of the investment banking firm of Lehman Brothers 
Kuhn Loeb Incorporated and the fairness of the $21.00 price per shar~ 
paid the cashed out UOP minority," 4 it took only two and one-half 
double-spaced typed pages to arrive at the conclusion that "[t]he judg-
ment of the Court of Chancery is affirmed." ~ 
The Weinberger Dissenting Opinion 
In dissent, Justice Duffy sees: 
"this case [as presenting] to the Delaware Courts important issues in-
volving the responsibility of an investment banking firm, in the 
context of a corporate merger, and the fairness of the price paid 
by a dominant majority stockholder to the minority (public) stock-
holders who were squeezed out of the enterprise by the merger. '' 6 
Focusing on the fact that "Lehman Brothers had been paid by UOP the 
sum of '$150,000 for the services rendered in connection with the 
preparation and delivery of' its opinion as to whether the merger was 
fair to the public stockholders," 7 Duffy argues that "there is at least 
enough [evidence] in the case to require a trial on the issue of reasonable 
care or competence [on the part of Lehman Brothers]." 8 
Duffy's disagreement with the assessment of fairness made by 
Lehman Brothers and accepted by the trial court is based on their failure 
sufficiently to recognize 
the benefit flowing to Signal "as a result of becoming the I 00 per-
cent owner" of UOP. . . . [This] benefit accruing to Signal as a 
result of the merger was real because, under Delaware law, the 
8 Id. 
4 Id. 
~ Id. at 5. 
6 /d.at6. 
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"stockholders of a corporation are the equitable owners of its 
assets". . . . And upon liquidation, the stockholders are entitled to 
a pro rata share of net assets. 0 
As a result of the merger which Signal had caused, the public 
stockholders were forced out of UOP and Signal acquired the 
equitable ownership of UOP assets which had been owned by the 
stockholders it cashed out. . . . In short, as far as the public stock-
holders were concerned, the mechanics were merger in form but 
liquidation in fact. 10 
Duffy, in other words, would not accept the vice-chancellor's con-
clusions. He begins his dissent, however, by noting that "I agree with 
much that the Vice Chancellor wrote in explaining his understanding of 
the prior law announced by this Court," 11 a statement made remarkable 
by the fact that it is precisely on matters of law (as opposed to findings 
of fact) that an appellate court is justified in replacing the trial court's 
views with its own. 
The Singer and Tanzer Decisions 
The reference is presumably to the dilemma posed by the first two 
Delaware decisions attempting to delineate guidelines governing the 
legality of cash-out mergers. Singer v. Magnavox Company held that 
use of the merger process for no purpose other than to eliminate the 
minority interests for cash, regardless of the amount paid therefor, is a 
violation of the fiduciary duty owed by a majority shareholder to the 
minority. 1 2 In Tanzer v. International Genera/Industries, Inc., however, 
the same three judges (Hermann, Duffy, and McNeilly) held that a cash-
out merger is permissible if the purpose is to further the interests of the 
majority shareholder, provided that the purpose is not merely a sub-
terfuge to enable the majority shareholder to rid itself of the unwanted 
minority. 1 ;j 
The vice-chancellor in this case reconciled these decisions by not-
ing that, in Singer, "proof of a purpose other than . . . minority freezeout 
9 Id. at 9. 
10 ld. at 10. 
11 I d. at 6. 
12 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) . 
18 Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). 
\ 
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does not end the matter and there still must be a hearing under the 
standard of Sterling," and that under Tanzer, "even if the purpose is 
bona fide, there still must be a hearing under the standard of Sterling, 
and at such a hearing it is not sufficient to limit the issue to price alone. 
Rather, price must be considered along with any other relevant 
factors ." 14 
Insofar as Duffy's dissent is based on the possibility that the price 
was not shown to be fair, his analysis of the vice-chancellor's findings · 
rests on the proposition that the transaction should be treated (from the 
minority shareholder's point of view) as "merger in form but liquida-
tion in fact" 15 : 
Net cash value was given little weight by Signal's expert because 
"there was no plan of its [UOP's] liquidation," 426 A.2d at 1362, 
and the Trial Court accepted that conclusion. As I read that ruling, 
the Court held that fairness to the minority was determined, not by 
an objective standard but by what Signal had not planned at the 
time of trial. And that is a rather strange approach. Signal can, of 
course, come up with a plan of liquidation when it wants to.10 
Given that focus, Duffy's agreement with the vice-chance1Ior's read-
ing of the law announced by prior decisions is especially troublesome, 
since the analysis of Singer and Tanzer stressed the central importance of 
the standards set out in the Sterling opinion. 
A Look at Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corporation 
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corporation/' a 1952 decision by the 
Delaware Supreme Court, involved an action by a minority shareholder 
seeking to enjoin the merger (share for share rather than cash) of a 
subsidiary into its parent because the "majority stockholder .. . occu-
p[ied], in relation to the minority, a fiduciary position in dealing with 
[the corporation]'s property. "18 The basis on which the trial court 
(whose action was aiTirmed in Sterling) concluded that the value of the 
exchange was fair was the report from the financial adviser on the basis 
of which the majority stockholder's directors had acted. The Delaware 
H Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1344 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
15 See text at note 10 supra. 
1o Slip op. at 10 (footnote). 
1193 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952). 
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Supreme Court rejected the arguments advanced by the Sterling plaintiffs 
as to why the exchange value should be considered unfair: 
If plaintiffs' contention should be accepted it would follow that upon 
every merger of a subsidiary into its parent corporation that involves 
a conversion of the subsidiary's shares into shares of the parent, the 
market value of the parent stock issued to the stockholders of the 
subsidiary must equal the liquidating value of the subsidiary's stock. 
On its face this proposition is unsound, since it attempts to equate 
two different standards of value. In the case of many industrial 
corporations, and also in the instant case, there is a substantial gap 
between the market value and the liquidating value of the stock; 
and to apply to the merger of such corporations the proposition 
advanced by plaintiffs would be to bestow upon the stockholder of 
the subsidiary something which he did not have before the merger 
and could not obtain-the liquidating value of his stock. H> 
Duffy cannot, therefore, mean that he agrees with the vice-chancellor 
that Sterling establishes as a matter of law the proposition that, in an 
attack on the fairness of the value received by minority shareholders in 
a merger, the liquidating value of the corporate property can justifiably 
_ be ignored. His meaning must be that, while he agrees with the vice-
chancellor about the importance of Sterling as a precedent, he believes 
that that precedent must be read considerably more flexibly than was 
done either by the vice-chancellor or by McNeilly and Quillen for the 
majority. 
Such a demand is not, on its face, unreasonable. Indeed, as lawyers 
know, any precedent can in fact be accommodated by a court that wishes 
not to overrule it, either by stressing more strongly an element that was 
considered only in passing in the earlier opinion, or by expanding the 
universe of the factors considered in arriving at the result. The price 1 
exacted by such shifts in the law is uncertainty about the applicable 
standard, but that uncertainty is necessary if the law is to be effective 
as a control device, a successful attempt to influence behavior that has 
not yet occurred. 
Thus, the clearer and more uniform a rule is, the more easily it is 
regarded as a formality that can justifiably be manipulated so long as 
compliance with its explicit formulation is maintained. It was presum-
ably precisely this problem that the vice-chancellor had in mind in 
warning, when he dismissed the original Weinberger complaint, that a 
19 /d. at 111. 
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merger will not be made "immune from attack by the simple device of 
structuring the merger agreement so as to require that it be approved 
by a majority of the minority shareholders. " 20 Because the merger 
attacked in Weinberger had been approved by a majority of the minority 
and because the vice-chancellor stressed that fact in his opinion dismissing 
the complaint, such approval began to be treated as mandatory for 
mergers attempting to comply with the standards laid down by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. One merger structured this way was attacked in · 
Harman v. Masoneilan Intern . Inc., 21 and the Delaware Supreme Court 
deferred issuing its opinion in that case to permit its issuance to coincide 
with the final Weinberger decision in order " to enable the Court to con-
sider the relationship of the two decisions in the context of the prior 
decision of the Court of Chancery in Weinberger."~~ In Harman, Horsey 
with Duffy, and Quillen in concurrence, distinguished the initial W ein-
berger complaint from that in Harman by noting that it was only in the 
amended Weinberger complaint (which amended complaint resulted in 
the decision being affirmed by the supreme court) that it was "alleged 
that the majority shareholder has disseminated proxy materials to the 
minority shareholders that contained material misrepresentations as well 
as material omissions which tainted the minority's approval of the 
merger. " :!:I 
It is on the basis of this distinction that the Harman court approves 
the original Weinberger dismissal. Thus, it argues that the original 
Weinberger "complaint was found not to state a Sterling-Singer fairness 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty because the majority shareholder was 
not charged with using its controlling position over the corporate 
machinery to accomplish the merger." 2~ It thus reconciles the dismissal 
of the unamended complaint in Weinberger with its conclusion in 
Harman that "a complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty by a 
majority stockholder in approving a merger allegedly fraudulent to the 
minority states a cause of action cognizable in equity when monetary 
relief is the only practicable remedy available and when defendants 
establish that the minority shareholders have themselves overwhelmingly 
approved the merger." 25 
20 Wcinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1267 (Del. Ch. 1979). 
21 442 A.2d 487 (1982) 0 
22 !d. (footnote) (advance sheet). 
23 /d. at 495-496 (footnote). 
24 /d. at 495. 
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Examining the Judicial Panels 
Because the Harman and Weinberger panels were different, the pre-
cise impact of Harman on the Weinberger analysis of the merits of a 
Sterling-Singer action remains unclear. Duffy dissented from the Wein-
berger opinion written by "McNeilly and Quillen . . . (for the ma-
jority) ," 2 r; and, in Harman, Quillen "files a concurring opinion joining 
in the judgment," ~; and Duffy joins the opinion by Horsey. The 
absence of McNeilly's views on the Harman situation is especially trouble-
some because his position is essential to an understanding of the impact 
of Singer and Tanzer on the meaning of Sterling as a precedent. 
The panels in both Singer and Tanzer consisted of Duffy, McNeilly, 
and Hermann, and Duffy wrote the opinion in both cases. Singer, al-
though handed down before Tanzer, appears in a later volume of the 
reporter, and McNeilly concurred in Singer on the basis that he "agree[ d) 
with the holding ... that a ... merger, made for the sole purpose of 
freezing out minotity stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process" 
and that "it is my opinion that Sterling v. Mayflower, 93 A.2d 107 
(1952), establishes an avenue for judicial scrutiny with a firm founda-
tion based upon factual determinations of fundamental fairness and 
economic reasonableness which should be our guidelines for future 
cases." 28 The statement in the McNeilly concurrence, written when 
Singer was handed down, that does not appear in the reporter .is that 
"[he was] inclined to think ... that the [Duffy] opinion waffles in its 
attempt to establish guidelines for future merger litigation with emphasis 
on the coined phrase 'business purposes,' which standing alone connotes 
nothing magic or definite." One can only assume that, at the time his 
opinion was published, McNeilly had perceived a congruence between 
Singer, Tanzer, and the Sterling precedent that was not clear to him 
when Singer was handed down. If that assumption is correct, it is 
apparent that what underlies Duffy's dissent in the present case is his view 
that however McNeilly now accommodates the decision in Weinberger 
to what was said in Sterling, Singer, and Tanzer, something in the ma-
jority opinion in Weinberger is inconsistent with that congruence. 
20 Slip op. at 1. 
2 7 Harman v. Masoneilan Intern. Inc., note 21 supra, at 489 (footnote). 
28 Singer v. Magnavox Co., note 12 supra, at 982. 
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Protecting the Minority Shareholders 
Duffy's dissent proposes a trial on what he characterizes as a "ques-
tion . . . of first impression in this Court, namely: does an invest-
ment banker who gives an opinion as to the value of stock, knowing 
that it will be used to help persuade minority public stockholders to 
transfer their shares to the majority stockholder at the price offered by 
the majority, owe any duty to the minority stockholders?" 29 The issue 
posed is not, of course, whether there is any duty at all . The question 
Duffy is raising is whether the fact that Lehman Brothers was paid by the 
majority stockholder requires the court to apply a high standard of 
reasonable care and competence in assessing the basis on which Lehman 
reached its conclusion as to fairness of price and in imposing liability in 
cases where that standard is not met. 
That issue, on its face, is one appropriately referred to the processes 
of law. Thus, one of the functions our society entrusts to the law is 
that of preventing management from using its position to gain unfair 
advantage over the shareholders whose capital the corporate structure 
puts at the disposal of management. Effective performance of such a 
function is crucial to the workings of the economy in a free society, 
since control over capital will be relinquished to managers only if the 
processes of law continue to be perceived by those who control capital 
as capable of providing the necessary protection. 
Perlman v. Feldman 
It was in an attempt to provide such protection that the Second Cir-
cuit held, in Perlman v. Feldman,30 that part of the premium received for 
control of a corporation had to be shared with the stockholders. What 
Perlman involved was sale at a premium above-market price of the 
controlling interest in a steel manufacturing plant shortly after the 
Korean War had begun to a corporation created for the purpose of the 
purchase by users of steel. In a public corporation, however, the ques-
tion of the percentage of outstanding shares that constitutes control is 
often no easier to answer than the question of what value is fair in a 
merger transaction. 
l It should therefore come as no surprise that when the Second Circuit was faced with the need to define what it meant by control (and thus to 
give operational content to the law declared in Perlman) a three-judge 
29 Slip op. at 7. 
30 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
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•/panel wrote three separate opinions, and agreed only that a trial was 
required in the district court.:n The rule of law promulgated in Perlman 
v. Feldman, in short, was sufficiently vague that it served solely to 
expand the scope of judicial intervention in business affairs. The fidu-
ciary standard on the basis of which a violation was found in Perlman 
was technically a matter of state law, but Rule lOb-5 provided the basis 
for a steady stream of opinions which had the same effect of expanding 
the scope of judicial intervention. Because Rule 1 Ob-5 was issued under 
the authority of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, moreover, such 
opinions placed exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.32 It was in 
response to Santa Fe Industries v. Green,:l:~ an attempt by the U.S. Su-
preme Court to call a halt to th is process, that Singer and Tanzer came 1 
before the Delaware courts. 
Santa Fe v. Green 
The holding in Santa Fe was that minority shareholders, dissatis-
fied with the terms of a merger consummated in accordance with statu-
tory Delaware law, were restricted to the appraisal remedy provided 
by the state law in the absence of allegations of misrepresentation or 
lack of disclosure. Justice Brennan dissented on the basis adopted by 
the Second Circuit: that a Rule 1 Ob-5 claim was stated by allegations 
that the majority was effecting a merger without any justifiable business 
purpose and that the proposed price to be paid for the shares was sub-
stantially lower than a price reflecting the appraised value of the 
physical assets. 34 
Part IV of the Santa Fe opinion noted: 
In addition to posing a "danger of vexatious litigation which could 
result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5," 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,740 (1975), 
[the proposed] extension of the federal securities laws would overlap 
and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law.3 " 
It concluded that "(t]here may well be a need for uniform federal fidu-
\]1 31 Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 306 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962). 
32 Section 27 of the Exchange Act gives the federal district courts "exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regu lations thereunder, and of 
all suits in equity and actions of law brought to enforce any liability for duty 
created by tbis title or the rules and regulations thereunder." 
ss 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977). 
34 /d. at 1304. 
85 ld. at 1303. 
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ciary standards to govern mergers such as those challenged in this 
complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial 
extension of § 10 (b)." 30 The basis for its holding was that "to the 
extent that Rule 1 Ob-5 is interpreted to require a valid corporate purpose 
for elimination of minority shareholders as well as a fair price f9r their 
shares, it would impose a stricter standard of fiduciary duty than that 
required by the law of some States," ::r and it was to test this view of state 
law (at least insofar as it was appl icable to Delaware) that Singer and · 
Tanzer were brought. 
The process of expanding federal jurisdiction over corporate trans-
actions undertaken by the Second Circuit has thus had, as one of its 
products, the substantive law embodied in Weinberger. Viewed from 
this perspective, it is clear that Duffy wants a more flexible reading of 
the Sterling precedent because the law established by Weinberger is that 
the question of the fairness of the price in a cash-out merger is to be 
treated by the appellate court as a matter of fact found by the trial 
court. The Duffy dissent, in other words, is a plea for the promulgation 
of rules of law, and the plea goes unanswered because the issues it 
raises go to the very core of what we mean by calling law what is in fact 
a process of courts adjudicating a succession of controversies. 
Thus, the trial called for by the Duffy dissent represents a justifiable 
expenditure of resources only if the facts of Weinberger are sufficiently 
different from those of Sterling; only if the Delaware Supreme Court 
can justify, as a matter of law, distinguishing the Lehman Brothers 
opinion as to fairness of price in Weinberger from the Sterling opinion 
as to the fairness of the exchange of stock.aH 
Will Duffy Be Proven Right? 
The U.S. Supreme Court has transformed dissents by Mr. Justice 
Holmes into the constitutional law of the F irst Amendment. It is thus 
by no means impossible for the Delaware Supreme Court eventually to 
find inadequate the rules that were law when Sterling was decided, and 
to order the trial for which D uffy is arguing. The question such a holding 
would raise, however, is the extent to which such "flexibility" in reading 
precedents is consistent with the provision of operational guidelines, the 
extent to which standards contained in precedents such as Sterling could 
justifiably continue to be characterized as law. 
30 /d. at 1304. 
37 /d. at 1304 n. 16. 
HS See text following note 18 supra. 
